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 Utopian Thinking for Progressive Constitutionalists 
MARK TUSHNET† 
The opening pages of Rousseau’s Social Contract have two striking phrases. The 
more celebrated is, “[m]an was born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”1 That, 
though, is preceded by this: “I want to inquire whether, taking men as they are and 
laws as they can be made to be, it is possible to establish some just and reliable rule 
of administration in civil affairs.”2 I take this second sentence as my guide: Taking 
the textual Constitution as it is and with the interpreted Constitution as it could be, 
can there be a constitutionalism that progressives could wholeheartedly endorse?3 
I contrast utopian thinking to the thinking grounding the day-to-day work of pro-
gressive litigators and academics focused on achieving the best outcomes possible in 
the courts (and legislatures) as they are, not as they could be. To focus on the 
Supreme Court: In such work the hoped-for outcome is one favorable to our long-
term goals. Ordinarily that means winning cases.4 With that goal in mind we un-
surprisingly count votes and understand that to win a victory for progressivism (to-
day) we have to develop arguments that have some chance of getting the vote of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy (or, or perhaps and, the vote of Chief Justice John Roberts). 
Doing so requires that we take Justice Kennedy’s “jurisprudence” seriously, 
working with it to show how, understood in the correct way, it supports progressive 
outcomes.5 Yet, at the same time, progressive constitutionalists ought not—indeed, 
I think, cannot—take Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence as correct in some deeper 
sense. It might be the best interpretation of the Constitution available today, but it is 
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 1. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 156 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002). 
 2. Id. at 154. 
 3. The title of this Essay was received by some readers of an earlier version as off-
putting, seemingly on the ground that the word “utopian” connoted “unrealistic” or 
“unachievable.” An alternative term—“aspirational”—was suggested. I have retained “uto-
pian” and rejected “aspirational” for several reasons: (1) the thinking I hope to encourage is 
utopian in the positive sense of seeking the constitutional rules for a good society; (2) that 
society is unachievable today and in the near future, but it is what political philosophers call a 
“realistic utopia,”—that is, one that can be achieved without requiring large transformations 
in individual psychology; (3) for me, “aspirational” is too weak, suggesting only that we orient 
our action today to the aspirational goals, without also believing that the aspirations can actu-
ally be realized. 
 4. Sometimes it might be enough—or the best possible outcome—that our arguments 
are taken seriously even if they are rejected, or are articulated in a forum whose prestige can 
give the arguments credibility in other fora even if they are rejected in courts. Those other fora 
include the popular imagination. Without discounting the fact that sometimes it makes sense 
in terms of a long-term strategy to make arguments without considering whether they are likely 
to prevail in the case at hand, I focus on the more usual situation in which the desired outcome 
is an immediate victory. 
 5. An example from scholarship is Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 
1278 (2011). 
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not the best interpretation of the Constitution. Here we might take a lesson from con-
servative legal scholars, who rather clearly distinguish between the two: Randy 
Barnett’s scholarship, for example, supports a far more restrictive interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause—his view of the best interpretation of the Constitution—than 
he argued for in the Affordable Care Act litigation—his view of the best interpreta-
tion of the Constitution available today.6 Conservatives understand the difference 
between advocacy positions shaped by the need to win votes on the Supreme Court 
and claims about the Constitution’s meaning as such. We should too. 
So, in tandem with our advocacy positions, we ought to develop utopian consti-
tutional visions—constitutional interpretations not likely to be adopted within the 
near future.7 Progressivism has many rooms, so there will be many utopian visions, 
and some may clash with others. Readers can generate for themselves their own ex-
amples. For what it is worth, mine center around a nonracialized social democracy, 
and in the next pages I sketch some aspects of what a utopian constitutionalism aimed 
at achieving such a social democracy might look like. But, I emphasize, this is only 
an example of what utopian constitutionalism for progressives might look like, not a 
program for others to adopt. 
Consider first affirmative action as a means of getting beyond racism.8 When orig-
inally adopted, affirmative action programs had a number of rationales. Prominent 
among them were restorative justice (placing African Americans in positions as close 
as possible to the ones they would have had, had they not been blocked by racism), 
distributive justice (ensuring that shares of social goods are distributed as they should 
be in a non-racist society), and reparations (repaying African Americans in kind for 
material deprivations they and their predecessors experienced in the past). For all 
practical purposes the Supreme Court has driven these justifications underground by 
defining them as insufficient to satisfy the demanding requirement that race-specific 
programs be narrowly tailored to advance compelling governmental interests; appar-
ently, only “diversity” is an available justification.9 
The contemporary discourse of affirmative action has been shaped by the Court’s 
jurisprudence. So, for example, progressives might explain how affirmative action in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001), with Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27–40 (2011) (statement of Randy E. Barnett, 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center), and The Constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 97–104 (2011) (state-
ment of Randy E. Barnett, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center). 
 7. As I discuss below, the Supreme Court is not the only venue in which constitutional 
interpretations are adopted. Congress is another, as are popular mobilizations. 
 8. The allusion, of course, is to Justice Blackmun’s assertion, “[i]n order to get beyond 
racism, we must first take account of race.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 9. I write “driven underground” because I believe that many of those who support af-
firmative action today do so because they believe that it genuinely advances a desirable diver-
sity and because they believe in addition that it serves the justice-based goals the Court has 
said are insufficient. In defending affirmative action under contemporary law, progressives 
would do well to develop an account of the constitutionality of “mixed motive” programs—
that is, those whose proponents are motivated by a combination of permissible purposes and 
purposes that, under existing doctrine, are insufficient on their own, to support the programs. 
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public contracting programs promotes diversity by bringing into consideration ways 
of organizing construction work associated with minority contractors that might be 
overlooked without affirmative action.10 A utopian constitutionalism of affirmative 
action would return restorative justice, distributive justice, and reparations to their 
proper place in constitutional discourse. And, important scholarly work would be 
needed to do so. With respect to distributive justice, for example, one would need to 
define the metric for measuring appropriate distribution of social goods; with respect 
to reparations, one would need to figure out “tracing” rules forward from those who 
were subject to racial discrimination in the past and backward from contemporary 
African Americans, some of whom are recent arrivals in the United States.11 Such 
work was in progress when the Court constricted constitutional discourse about af-
firmative action. It needs to be revived.12 
Next consider the structure of political opportunities. Recently scholars of com-
parative constitutional law have written about “abusive constitutionalism,” the use 
of constitutionally validated actions to transform liberal democracies into 
something less.13 Progressives might adopt the term to describe a nation in which 
a political party engages in voter suppression targeted at groups that 
disproportionately favor its opponents, develops gerrymandering programs aimed 
at entrenching their party’s control of legislatures,14 enacts tax laws that punish 
residents of states where their political opponents dominate,15 and structures a 
system of financing political campaigns that stacked the cards in its favor 16—and 
gets a supreme court dominated by judges nominated by presidents of that party to 
approve the entire program. 
Of course the Supreme Court’s cases leave room for progressives to challenge 
specific aspects of this program.17 I focus on campaign finance because the pattern 
I described in connection with affirmative action can be seen in the campaign 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. I personally find it easier to understand this claim in connection with gender-based 
affirmative action, where one might plausibly argue that female-organized workplaces might 
be more cooperative—and productive—than male-organized ones. But, I am confident that 
the argument can be developed in connection with race as well. 
 11. For a discussion of some of the tracing issues associated with reparations, see BORIS 
I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973). 
 12. And, I am sure, it is. See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, 
(June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations 
/361631 [https://perma.cc/K35S-ERG5]. This is not the place, though, for a bibliography of 
recent work on the older rationales for affirmative action. 
 13. The term originated with David Landau. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013). 
 14. See DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO STEAL 
AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY (2016). 
 15. See Michael C. Dorf, The New Tax Law Punishes Blue States: Is That Constitutional?, 
JUSTIA: VERDICT (Dec. 27, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/12/27/new-tax-law-punishes-
blue-states-constitutional [https://perma.cc/V4MS-7B6B].  
 16. See JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND 
THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016). 
 17. On voter suppression, see Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc); 
on partisan gerrymandering, see Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) 
(three-judge court).  
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finance cases as well. Supporters of stricter regulation of campaign finance began 
by claiming that a system regulated only around the margins promoted corruption 
of civic processes and tilted the playing field in favor of policies favored by the 
wealthy. The Supreme Court described the latter claim as seeking the rough 
equalization of financial resources available to serious candidates, characterized it 
as “wholly foreign to the First Amendment,”18 and eliminated it as a potential 
rationale for restrictive campaign finance regulation: Only reducing opportunities 
for corruption could justify restrictions on campaign finance. 
Progressive advocates of restrictive campaign finance rules have worked within 
the “anti-corruption” rationale by developing new and interesting accounts of cor-
ruption19—which the Supreme Court rejected.20 At this point, I think, only utopian 
constitutionalism points the way forward. Progressives simply have to ignore the 
Court’s doctrine and return to the equalization rationale for campaign finance regu-
lation. And, as with affirmative action, returning to abandoned lines of thought will 
require serious conceptual work. The idea of equalization is hardly transparent. No 
one could plausibly contend that every party that qualifies for the ballot is entitled 
to exactly the same resources. How are we to measure “how much” money each 
candidate should be allowed to raise? With reference to support in the polls? With 
reference to how many small contributions the candidate is able to garner? And, 
lying beyond all this is the devilishly difficult question of regulating truly 
independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate.21 
Dealing with doctrine dealing with structuring political opportunities is an 
essential predicate to progressive legislative achievements. We know from 
experience around the world that creating a relatively dense social safety net, 
another component of social democracy, will require such achievements. Courts 
can play some role in enforcing social welfare rights, but they will not be at the 
center of a progressive utopian constitutionalism of social democracy. Consider 
for example the right to adequate health care. There are many alternative 
reasonable definitions of such a right: a minimum core of basic or essential 
mechanisms of care for and prevention of illness, not only available but actually 
provided to all; adequate levels of healthfulness given the society’s available 
resources; and more. No plausible account of progressive constitutionalism would 
commit the choice among these definitions exclusively to the courts.  
Even more, designing the institutions to implement the right, however defined, 
is well beyond the capacity of even the best set of judges we could imagine, much 
more beyond the capacity of ordinary (progressive) judges. Judges might work 
around the edges, identifying occasions on which system designers overlooked 
important considerations or came up with institutions that sometimes misfired, but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976). 
 19.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (rev. ed. 2015); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014). 
 20. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014) (holding that “the only type 
of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo corruption” (italics in original)). 
 21. We can without strain design institutions aimed at smoking out nominally indepen-
dent contributions that are actually coordinated with the candidate. The problem of truly inde-
pendent contributions would remain. 
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utopian constitutionalism would commit the major part of defining and designing 
social welfare rights to legislatures. 
At this point it seems important to me to emphasize that, in contrast to the two 
doctrinal areas I’ve already discussed, here there is essentially no Supreme Court 
doctrine to work with. The Court has held that there is no free-standing federal con-
stitutional right to education, for example,22 and the now-long-ago cases dealing with 
other social welfare rights tried—and failed—to invoke the Equal Protection Clause 
to justify extensions of existing statutory components of the social safety net.23 The 
materials for constructing arguments for social welfare rights must be found primar-
ily outside the Supreme Court’s cases.24 
I have now suggested that utopian constitutionalism for progressives must move 
beyond the Supreme Court, in two ways: Supreme Court doctrine may be unduly 
constricting, and it may be unavailable. Moving beyond the Supreme Court has im-
plications for how we think about the Court itself. The most modest claim is that, for 
progressives, existing Supreme Court doctrine has no authority in the Raz-ian sense. 
That is, the mere fact that the Supreme Court has said that equalization is an im-
permissible justification for campaign finance regulation—and the other things it has 
said in other doctrinal domains—carries no independent normative weight beyond that 
flowing from the reasons the Court has given. In constructing constitutional arguments, 
Supreme Court decisions have only the weight the reasons the Court offers rationally 
deserve. Sometimes that weight will be a lot, sometimes it will be rather little. 
Saying that Supreme Court decisions have no Raz-ian authority sometimes raises 
hackles among progressives with respect to decisions we like. We imagine our op-
ponents saying, about those decisions, “The reasons the Court gave for its ruling are 
inadequate in our view. Because the Court’s decisions have no Raz-ian authority, we 
are justified in acting on our own assessment of the balance of reasons.” So, for ex-
ample, opponents of marriage equality, finding Obergefell badly reasoned, say they 
can justifiably act on the reasons they think correct—and discriminate in various ways 
against those who seek to implement the right to marriage equality. Some progressives 
find this troubling, and, for that reason, sometimes want to give independent normative 
weight to the mere fact that the Supreme Court came out one way or another. 
The issue of the Court’s Raz-ian authority has been a matter of long-standing con-
troversy. My own view, developed at some length elsewhere, is that there are often 
good prudential reasons for people, especially public officials, to accede to Court 
decisions that, in their view, fail to provide adequate reasons for their holdings.25 For 
present purposes, though, another more partisan point is important: Conservatives 
already deny Raz-ian authority to Supreme Court decisions with which they dis-
agree. For progressives to give such authority to Supreme Court decisions is to skew 
the discursive field against us: We would be giving the Court authority in cases with 
which we agree and in cases with which we disagree, while conservatives give the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 23. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 24. The ongoing project by Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath is an example of utopian 
constitutionalism for progressives in this vein. See Symposium, The Constitution and 
Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287 (2016). 
 25. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney 
General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017 (1987). 
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Court authority only in cases with which they agree (and with which we disagree) 
but not in cases with which they disagree.26 
Extending utopian constitutionalism beyond the courts raises another question. In 
what sense is the project I’ve sketched one in constitutional theory rather than, for 
example, in political theory? That is, once we treat Supreme Court doctrine as rele-
vant only to the extent that the doctrine rests on good reasons independent of the 
Court’s authority, how is the utopian constitutional analysis of affirmative action, the 
structure of political opportunities, and social welfare rights different from political 
theories—untethered to the U.S. Constitution or indeed any constitution—about 
those same topics? 
The place to begin, I think, is by rejecting as descriptively inaccurate the second 
part of Charles Evans Hughes’s widely cited statement, “We are under a 
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is. . . .”27 That statement 
is descriptively inaccurate if given the narrow interpretation that most readers give 
it: The judicially interpreted Constitution is not what the Supreme Court says it is. 
As Hughes’s statement implies, even the judicially interpreted Constitution is some-
times and to some extent what lower court judges say it is.28  
Even more, the judicially interpreted Constitution is not the Constitution full stop. 
We have long known that the courts leave some constitutional provisions 
“underenforced.”29 That is, the courts do not enforce—and sometimes do not even 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. For myself—though I doubt for other progressives—I think that progressives should 
go beyond denying Raz-ian authority. We should treat the Court’s decisions as occasionally 
interesting but mostly banal expressions of views about the Constitution, on a par with op-ed 
pieces in major newspapers written by partisans advancing a political agenda under the guise 
of neutral analysis. Here too my concern is with asymmetry. Conservatives already treat pro-
gressive decisions as “merely” partisan. When progressives argue that, with “minor” excep-
tions like Bush v. Gore (and Citizens United and Shelby County), the Court addresses consti-
tutional claims in politically neutral terms, the effect may be selectively to validate 
conservative decisions in general discussions of the Court: For conservatives, progressive de-
cisions are by definition merely political, whereas for both progressives and conservatives, 
conservative decisions are politically neutral. Put another way: In contemporary discourse 
only conservatives or progressives who take conservative positions can be principled. I think 
that’s why Justice Scalia’s stance on flag burning attracts so much attention (and, perhaps, the 
positions taken by Justices Souter and Breyer on the equal protection issue in Bush v. Gore). 
See, e.g., DAVID M. DORSEN, THE UNEXPECTED SCALIA: A CONSERVATIVE JUSTICE’S LIBERAL 
OPINIONS (2017). I do not expect to see any time soon a book by a conservative with the title, 
“The Unexpected Ginsburg [or Breyer or . . . ]: A Liberal Justice’s Conservative Opinions,” 
not because there aren’t any, but because such a book would undermine the conservative claim 
that progressive constitutionalism is merely partisan. In my view, progressives would be better 
off were we to eliminate the asymmetry by treating all decisions with some political inflection 
as partisan.  
 27. Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Elmira Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in 
ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 133, 139 (1908). 
 28. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 921 (2016); Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 79 
VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2017). 
 29. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
2018] UTOPIAN THINKING  239 
 
articulate—the substantive content of those provisions. That in turn implies that the 
provisions’ substantive content is supplied by other institutions. In my view, for ex-
ample, the U.S. social welfare state has constitutional status, but lies mostly outside 
the domain of judicial enforcement. It is composed of a web of state and national 
statutes and is subject to regular construction and reconstruction—both in the sense 
that legislatures are “construing” the Constitution when they enact, amend, and 
sometimes repeal components of the social safety net and in the sense that they are 
directly building that net. 
These constitutional constructions do not come out of nowhere, though. The pol-
iticians who enact the statutes respond to normative views they hold, which lead them 
to seek elected office, combined with electoral pressures generated by what the liter-
ature has come to call social movements. As Joseph Fishkin, William Forbath, and 
James Gray Pope have shown, labor activists and advocates for expansive social pro-
vision and redistributive taxation historically connected their claims to the constitu-
tion.30 Leaders of and participants in those movements described their goal as equal-
ity, linked to the Constitution directly through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause and, more deeply, through what the movements characterized as 
the Constitution’s fundamental commitment to a republican political order. Such an 
order, they argued, required that no citizens be dependent upon others for their ma-
terial well-being, so that they could participate in civic deliberations by focusing on 
the public good without needing to use politics to guarantee their survival.31 
An important feature of social movements’ use of constitutionalized discourse is 
that it was often utopian in my sense. Sometimes participants in such movements did 
say that they believed that the Supreme Court in place at the time would vindicate 
their claims.32 Often, though, they knew that the Supreme Court was quite unlikely 
to agree with them in the short run. Their goal in using constitutionalized discourse 
was to change prevailing understandings of the Constitution’s meaning, perhaps to 
the point where their understandings would become the Supreme Court’s. 
As the social-movement example shows, utopian constitutionalism for progres-
sives requires adopting a long time-perspective. The Supreme Court as it is and as 
it’s likely to be for the next decades is unlikely to adopt utopian constitutional inter-
pretations.33 The decisional dynamics on a closely divided Supreme Court will impel 
the Court’s progressives to do their best to gradually shift the direction of doctrinal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 669 (2014); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 
941 (1997). 
 31. I note that translating the civic republican concern about equality and dependence into 
doctrinal terms is relatively easy in some contexts—campaign finance regulation being the 
most obvious—and more difficult in others. 
 32. Most notably, see Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to the First Montgomery 
Improvement Association (MIA) Mass Meeting (Dec. 5, 1955), in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE 10 
(Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard eds. 2001) (“If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this 
nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong.”).  
 33. Individual justices might occasionally do so. A good example is Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor’s dissent in Schuette v. Coalition. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1651–83 (2014), which came closer than any prior opinion to defending the proposition that race-
based affirmative action is constitutionally required and not merely constitutionally permissible. 
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development—incrementally expanding the types of activities that can be described 
as corruption in the context of campaign finance regulation, or loosening the con-
straints of the diversity rationale in affirmative action cases. Incremental doctrinal 
development can lay the groundwork for later interpretations that would not seem 
utopian when they come about, but that are utopian today. 
Utopian constitutionalism for progressives can supplement the work of progres-
sive litigators doing their best to squeeze these incremental victories out of the 
Supreme Court as it is.34 For me, Antonio Gramsci described well the stance we 
should take: “Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.”35 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. I have sometimes heard concern expressed that utopian constitutionalism for progres-
sives allows conservatives to counter the arguments for incremental doctrinal development by 
arguing that the progressive litigators’ position is simply a stalking horse for the far broader 
utopian claims—or, in another animal metaphor, that the litigators’ arguments are the camel’s 
nose under the tent. My response is one that I’ve already given (and one that is important to 
keep in mind generally): Conservatives already make such arguments, and progressives gain 
no strategic or rhetorical advantages from attempting to suppress utopian constitutional think-
ing. (This is not to say, of course, that progressives cannot disagree among ourselves about the 
content of utopian constitutionalism, as I have already suggested in describing the substantive 
positions sketched in this Essay as an example of and not a program for utopian constitution-
alism for progressives.) 
 35. Gramsci is said to have placed the phrase, originally from Romain Rolland, on the 
masthead of the newspaper he edited, L’Ordine Nuovo, but I have been unable to locate an 
image showing the masthead. 
